Carlos Ghosn Nissan Ceo

Carlos Ghosn as chief executive officer of Nissan and Renault Can He Re turn the Nissan Magic? We k late approximately mickle were relate round the potential for close clashes, betwixt the cut and the lacquerese, but it was non an issue. Cultural differences should be make use ofd as a catalyst for change, non as a crutch that inhibits change. You can learn a lot from soulfulness who is non exchangeable you. 1 Carlos Ghosn, CEO, Nissan. Make sure you are focussed on your own people. Bring in them motivation and sense of ownership, then(prenominal) you can do your miracle. 2 Carlos Ghosn, CEO, Nissan. Introduction In 2002, Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault proclaimed that Carlos Ghosn, the president and CEO of Nissan would also take up over the reigns at Renault in April 2005, spot Schweitzer would remain the chairman of the board. With the tonic position , Carlos Ghosn would lead dickens companies Nissan and Renault. As of 2004,Renault held 44%stake in Nissan an d Nissan lease almost 15%of Renaults shares. flip-flop artist, as Carlos Ghosn was called was behind the indus chastises most remarkable turnaround at Nissan. by and by he became the CEO of Nissan in 1999, he had brought in m all un-Japanese changes in the Japanese phoner and had get alongively persuaded the employees to accept change. Carlos Ghosn was credited for reviving the fellowship from$254million losses and $19 one thousand million debt in 1999 into meshing within deuce years. After winning up his position as the CEO of Renault in April 2005,CarlosGhosn is equally to character many challenges. Heading two contrary cable car companies from two different countries was archetypal of its engaging and perseverance observers expressed doubts whether Ghosn would be able to take up the pressure and rework the Nissanmagic.Carlos Ghosn The Nissan MagicIn March 1999,Renault, the then ninth auto maker in the world announced its coalescency with Nissan investing $5. 4 b illion. Nissan was in losses for many years from 1990-1999 except for loot describe in 1997(Annexure I) and looked out for intermitners to recover from the troubles. The brand recognition was genuinely execrable and it was estimated that Nissan was losing $ pace for any car it sold in US. By the end of 1990s,Nissan exported cars to atomic build 63 and Australia and some parts of Asia. The company was in losses to the tune of $5. billion, had debts totaling around $19 billion and was suffering from a poor return portfolio and change magnitude brand pass judgment. Nissans securities industry share had dropped from 6. 6 %in 1991 to 4. 9%by late 1990s. Renault at the corresponding(p) prison term was expatiateing internationally by acquisitions. After the un winning fusion with Volvo, Renault under Louis Schweitzer entered into an alliance with Nissan acquiring a 36%stake in the company. Triggering the alliance was Nissans strength in product traffic patterns and sophist icated manufacturing that fuseed well with the engineering reference at Renault.For Renault, the alliance would religious service in international expansions in the long-term date for Nissan it was to get rid of its short troubles that had hoard. Initially industry observers were skeptical nearly a non-Japanese manager successfully leading a Japanese planetary house. enchantment Carlos Ghosn was successful in cutting constitutes and had sometimes imposed dangerous regimes during his tenure atMichelin3, many were apprehensive if he would be successful in Japan. He was 46 when he joined Nissan and was far younger than the inferior managers in the company.Carlos Ghosn k spick-and-span nonhing about Japan and had no knowledge of the grow there. He in one case utter that he had a rattling vague judgement about the country and accepted, I did not try to learn in aforesaid(prenominal)(p) manner much about Japan before coming, because I didnt hope to have too many pre c at a timeived ideas. I demanded to memorise Japan by being in Japan with Japanese people. 4On the first day, when Carlos Ghosn arrived at Nissan, he took an elevator to reach his office. As he entered the lift, which was already packed with workers who were coming up from garage, everyone knew he was the new CEO. To his surprise, at every floor the lift s buy the farmped, none got subjugate.Finally, when he got gloomy, the employees bowleg as he left and went back to their floors. After such an unlooked-for incident, which reflected major(ip) pagan difference, Carlos Ghosn realized how important it was to understand them. Since the first day, Carlos Ghosn had do the cultural diversity a catalyst quite than a crutch for the company. 5 Next & ampgt&gt 1Carlos Ghosns interview, Interview The road to ruin, www. themanufacturer. com, declination 2002 2Parachkevova, Anna CEO out avocation organisations Nissans resurgence, www. thedartmouth. com, May 12th 2004 3Carlos Ghos n joined Michelin in 1974, where he was chairman and CEO ofno(prenominal)th American operations and had undertook several woo cutting initiatives. 4Carlos Ghosn standing(a) at the global crossing, http//web-japan. org, April 5th 2002 5Throwing past the culture crutch, 2000 Automotive moderns World Congress, January 18th 2000 Carlos Ghosn The Nissan Magic Cont However, since the beginning, Carlos Ghosn was in a Catch-22 situation as Japanese were not used to dictatorship kind of leadership. He knew that if he tried to dictate terms, that could lead to bruising employee morale, and if he remained lenient, it could hinder the required change.Instead of imposing change ,CarlosGhosn brought about the conduct for destiny in operations by mobilizing them an agers. Carlos Ghosn identified that the basic flaw with Nissans culture when he took over was that employees were reluctant to accept the failures and held other departments or economic conditions responsible for them. This resulte d in a lack of urgency among employees as everyone assumed the other would take action. He found that sooner of result the problems, they were trying to live with them.Nissan through and throughout 1990s, had been concentrating on short-termmarket share growth earlier than long termgrowth and instead of investing its profits towards product portfolio improvement itwas consumption themtowards equity purchases of other companies especially its suppliers. Its product profile was comparatively out-of-date with old designs when customers craved for stylish designs while competitors were steadily foc apply on new product designs. By 1999, it had around $4 billion held in the form of shares while its purchasing be remained very high, around 20-25%to a greater extent than that of Renaults.The employees openly resisted cross-functional teams, as they strongly believed in territories and sectionalism, which was a major part of their culture. Carlos Ghosn explicateed, Engineers work ver y well together, financial people work very well together, gross salespeople work very well together. But when you start to tot an engineer, a marketer, a salessomebody, and a manufacturer, here all the strengths of Japan in teamwork disappear. 6To overcome the resistance, he had to explain to the employees why the cross-functional teams were important and how they would tinge the overall benefits.Carlos Ghosn believed that the general piece tendency was to resist anything different. He considered that by accepting change, people tend to become stronger, as they understand the differences and try to analyze the causes for such differences. Cross-functional teams were formed and employees were refer in the revitalization process. This helped Carlos Ghosn explain his plans and gain acceptance easily. Through these cross-functional teams, employees were made to look beyond their line of responsibilities, understanding the nitty- gritties of the other departments as well.After the cross-functional teams were in place, people owned up responsibility whenever something went wrong. The solution to Nissans problems was inside the company. The main idea we would have for revival meeting of the company would be a rebuilt motivation of Nissan employees and partners, he explained. 7 at a time subsequently appointing the teams, they were asked to submit plans to achieve the maximum practicable output in each area and within a week decisions were made. The outcome was the Nissan revival Plan (NRP).After the NRPwas announced, every aspect from the timing, the plan schedules and the commitments as well as targets were clearly sayd. Shiro Tomii, vice president, Nissan Japan remarked, He establishes high yet come-at-able goals makes everything clear to all roles and levels of responsibility, works with speed checks on progress and appraises results establish on fact. 8 Next &gt&gt 6Carlos Ghosn standing at the global crossing, op. cit 7Saadi, Dania Nissans mi racle man fissures clues to solving national economic woes, www. lebanonwire. com 8David Magee, Turnaround how Carlos Ghosn rescued NissanCarlos Ghosn The Nissan Magic Cont Listening to the employees and facilitating their participation in the decision-making process, was key aspect of Carlos Ghosns leadership. By avoiding impersonal meetings through mails, he stressed the need for face-to-face communication. He believed that the people close to the company could come out with better solutions than an outsider like him. In contrast, the Japanese were polite, reticent and never spoke about the plans to their boss. Carlos Ghosn had to repeatedly explain to the employees that he needed their viewpoints and would not mind if they cover out.This, according to him was the greatest hurdle. While in France at Renault, he stress on teamwork, in Japan he believed it was not required and instead individual(a)ity was given to a greater extent prominence. Price Water house Coopers in a rep ort on change management listed Carlos Ghosns key human resource management techniques calling them very simple and straightforward By maintaining transparency from the stage of planning to action, he aimed at the best manageable out comes while also lifting the morale of the employees who were particularly distressed later the crisis at the company.He invited suggestions from every influential individual from suppliers, Nissans ex-employees, drawers etc. He explained, As you know credibility has two legs, writ of execution, and transparency. Performance, we had none to show at the time, so we were determined to be highly transparent. 9He called the NRP, an organizations corporal effort involving thousands of employees at every managerial level. To show his commitment to the plan, he say that he would resign along with other top executives if the plan fails in bringing in the benefits. Carlos Ghosn fateed immediate results by fixing short-term targets.While he called the pas sive vogue of management-by-consensus a killer, an active and constructional version could work miracles, according to him. He believed that an 85%consensus was enough and one hundred%was not eer crucial. While cultural adaptability had been his key, he was also at the analogous time affirmative about giving more(prenominal) priority to the bottom-line growth rather than just to the cultural aspects. He remarked, I do not want to intentionally offend people, but I am more touch about making Nissan profitable again than being culturally sensitive. 10 The first phase of NRP focused on cutting the be and astir(p) profits.The first major step Carlos Ghosn undertook was divestments from subsidiaries to reduce the debt. Suppliers accounted for major part of appeals of toil and the age-old Keiretsu system and the obligations that came with it were adding to heavy costs11. Deviating from the system, Carlos Ghosn opened the purchasing offer to all the suppliers encouraging new s uppliers who were ready to supply at low prices. As part of the revival plan, suppliers were forced to offer discounts to the tune of 20-30%and the number of suppliers was brought down to 600 from 1145 while the purchasing costs were reduced by 20%.During a meeting with the dealers of Nissan, Carlos Ghosn announced, I dont want any excuses. I want to know what you are sledding to do to make things better. 12 toll cutting at each stage began to be regarded as the need of the hour as the employees were encouraged to reduce expenses through all possible ways. The cross functional teams were given one month time to point areas to cut costs and adjoin the profits through bottom-line growth. Next &gt&gt 9Ibid. 10Larimar, Tim Japan, Nissan and Ghosn revolution, www. sb. columbia. edu 11The Keiretsu system, in which the companies maintained fusion with each of its suppliers, safekeeping shares in those companies, transferring managers characterized the big family of companies and its suppliers were both dual-lane relationships 12Larimar, Tim Japan, Nissan and Ghosn revolution, op. cit. Carlos Ghosn The Nissan Magic Cont The most un-Japanese practices like closing plants and cutting work force, in a country, which believed in biography employment, were the biggest of all challenges.When he planned to close five plants which included both assembly plants and power train plants, the board of directors were not informed until the darkness before, as Carlos Ghosn knew some people within the company wanted his plans to fail. After he announced, he was reported to have threatened, If this leaks out, Ill close seven plants, not five. 13For Carlos Ghosn, convincing the labor unions over the disadvantages of rigid job commentary was a big task. The seniority- shankd promotion that was entrenched in the Japanese firm was replaced by a performance based and merit-based incentive system.Instead of sacking people, which was against the culture in Japan, 21,000 jobs w ere cut through retirements, pre-retirements and golden handshakes out of which 16500 were in Japan alone. The plants were closed, while offering alternative jobs to the employees in other plants of the company. The complex manufacturing structure, which involved 24 platforms at seven assembly plants, was brought down to 12 platforms, which were shared by four plants. Around 10%of the retail outlets were closed and 20%of the dealer affiliates was streamlined to further reduce selling and marketing expenses.After the phase one of the revival plan was over, Nissan reported profits of $1. 5 billion for six months amidst April to September, which was the best results the company had ever seen. At the same time, Carlos Ghosn began to be called an iconoclast, who had brought in some un-Japanese, western style of culture in the companys operations. He, in contrast to the traditional Japanese parentage etiquettes, shook hands with his partners and other executives. As a result, there was discontented among the traditionalists and other industry associations in the country.And his bold decisions like closing plants, had invited repugnance among many including the insiders and Ghosn began to take along a bodyguard wherever he went The cross-cultural amalgamation between a French and a Japanese firm, raised several other challenges. The alliance aimed at cost nest egg through sharing of platforms and engineering capabilities. Initially though the employees and the design engineers were positive(p) over the superiority of the platforms brought in from the Renault plants, they were reluctant to adopt them.To overcome resistance, repair meetings were conducted among the Nissan and Renault employees. While at the same time, Carlos Ghosn began to recruit more designers from Japan to design new models. He maintained that the best way to lap up the cultural differences was to avoid forcing the cultural blend. Rather, he believed in appreciating the differences between t he cultures and minimizing the cultural clashes by bringing in a performance-driven management. To ensure that the Japanese staff understands what the French managers spoke, English was made the uncouth language in the company.A dictionary of 100 key words used by them management was prepared to solve the differences in the way each work was interpreted by French as well as Japanese. The words included commitment, transparency, objectives, and targets etc. Carlos Ghosn The Nissan Magic Cont In Japan, attending all formal parties of suppliers was very important and one was not supposed to miss them un slight there was a strong reason. When Carlos Ghosn missed the New Year Party hosted by the suppliers association, it was considered as a sign of failure to their culture.Carlos Ghosn had attended all such gatherings since then. Carlo sGhosn understood all these subtle aspects, which were an essendial part of the culture, as he began adapting to them. In the second phase of the reviva l plan, which started in 2001, Carlos Ghosn stressed on selling more cars, improving the top line growth as well. Dropping non-performing products from its portfolio, the company introduced trendy new models in SUVs and minivans category. An updated Z sports coupe was reintroduced in the market. The phase two increased sales by one million and debt was brought down to zero.With his unconventional leadership style and charisma, he began tow in praises from the employees of the company as well as from the industry and the public. both(prenominal)times, people in streets would stop him and wish him success apothegm, Gambatte go for it. sentence magazine named him the most influential global business executive and more and more Japanese companies were embarking on the gaijin Foreigner-Ghosns style for attaining maximum benefits in a short time. His colleagues at Nissan were particularly impressed by his lettering towards achievement of targets and his 24/7 work ethics reinforcing th e importance of demanding work.His devotion towards the revival of the company from problems, for which he was not in any way responsible, encouraged his peers to work hard and contribute towards a common goal. Toshiyuki Shiga who was made in charge of the Nissans expansions in China had once remarked, He told me to make a clear strategy for Nissan in China, and he gave me two months to do it. 14While he ensured that the progress was undertaken without keeping any individual responsible for the past crisis, he was also at the same time particular about results. Dominique Thormann, senior vice president, Nissan Europe, said, To people who dont accept that performance is what is at stake, he can be ruthless. 15 Calling his turnaround at Nissan a near death experience, Carlos Ghosn said he had experienced extensive cultural diversities during his tenure at Renault, Nissan, Nissans North American business and Samsung drives, a Korean based company acquired by Renault. His management style is woven around two attributes- value and motivation. He believed in motivating employees and demanding performance by empowering them. Your employees must be interested in what is going on in the company. Nothing is more inefficient than a boring company. You have to create an interesting milieu where people are interested in the story you are creating and want to hear the happy ending, he said. He was called Ice Breaker by Daimler Chryslers Chairman Jurgen E. Schrempp because of his unconventional thinking and implementing western style of management in Japan breaking the prevalent myth in the industry. Carlos Ghosn The Nissan Magic ContThe biweekly cockeyed series, The true life of Carlos Ghosn featured Nissans CEO Carlos Ghosn, depicting his popularity in the industry as well as the country. Some others called him an ambassador of change, the troubleshooter and considered him as a role model for all those business executives who were seeking solutions to the poor state of their companies in Japan. After the implementation of the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP), within two years, the company recovered from the losses and reported a 10. 2%increase in its revenues and nearly 84%increase in its operate profits .Though the sales had not considerably improved, the cost cuttings contributed towards improving the bottom line. In May 2001, the company reported its largest net profit of $2. 7 billion. Carlos Ghosn was named the businessman of the year by Fortune magazine in 2002 and Auto mobile powder magazine called him man of the year for his contributions to Nissan. Renault increased its stake in Nissan to 44. 4%while Nissan owned 13. 5%of Renaults share capital. However, by 2003,Nissan started experiencing a downward trend in its sales, as the book of account of goods that passed out from dealers was dropping in size.Customers regularly complained of quality defects and Nissans rank in overall quality (as per a study by J. D. PowerAssociates) dropped to 11th in 2004 from6th in 2003. It looked as the rigorous tenseness on the smart execution of the restructuring had resulted in these quality defects while Ghosn apprised he would fix them. To counter the situation, in May 2004, he sent a quality control team of 220 engineers to the Nissan plant in Smyrna (Tennessee) and every part of the assembly line went through a detailed scrutiny.Subtle issues like the workers who wore studded jeans and rings causing scratches to the freshly painted cars, etc came to light. Ghosn was amazed at some very obvious ones, which could be rectified at the plant, like defective doors and reading lights etc. Carlos Ghosn had already achieved two of the three goals that were cast for NRP, the debt was cleared and profitability was achieved. The Nissan 180, an extension of NRP was launched and aimed at surplus sales volume of one million annually from 2005, the third objective of NRP. US market was considered to play a key role in achieving the goal of additional one million sales.A new plant was set up in Canton, the first in North America where Nissan was facing challenges from other Japanese automakers, Toyota and Honda. Mean while, Nissan was planning an alliance with Mitsubishi after Daimler Chrysler gave up its plans of partnership with Mitsubishi. The partnership would help Nissan enter the mini car segment while Mitsubishi would be able to reduce cost burden of new product development. The shortfall of steel supplies forced Nissan to reduce its production in 2004, affecting production of 15,000 units amounting to $58. 5million of loss in sales.Nissan closed its plants for five days following the shortage of supplies, as steel prices in creased with demand for steel increasing after the economic boom in China. While halting production was considered a sign of mismanagement many felt that Carlos Ghosns attempt to bring down the number of suppliers as part of NRP, had resulted in over-reliance on few suppliers . However, Ghosn defended himself saying that the savings achieved during that phase were far more $9. 7 billion than the losses incurred imputable to loss of sales. Renault The French Automaker Renault was a state owned judicature enterprise since 1945.It was started as a motorized vehicle assembler in 1898. Renault built trucks, airplane engines and heavy vehicles during the World War II and after the war and with the economic boom, Renault achieved high volume sales with its low cost cars like 4CV, Renault 4 and Renault 5 through the 1970s and 1980s. During early 1980s, Renault expand into US by acquiring half the shares of American Motor Corporation. However, the deal was unprofitable and the company had to withdraw from the market in 1987. A comparable deal failed in Mexico, and with both the deals financed through debts, Renault was left ith huge debts accumulated by the end of 1980s. It reported losses of $3. 5 billion between 1984 and 1986. Further, because it was a state owned busi ness, obligations with labour unions led to more costs for the company. When Louis Schweitzer joined Renault in 1986,Renault had accumulated debts to the tune of $9 billion and was in huge losses. Its proposed merger with Sweden based ABVolvo in 1993 failed due to unfavorable French political climate and with Swedish shareholders expressing reservation. The company continued to be in losses till 1996,when Schweitzer brought in Carlos Ghosn as the executive vice president.Under the duo, product quality was improved, outsourcing secondary activities and overheads were reduced along with reduction in workforce. The same time, French government started setting ground for its IPO when Louis Schweitzer discovered that privatization of the company could only save it. In July 1996, the IPO was completed. By 1998,with the midsize model Scenic, Renault was successful in European market and in 1998 alone it made profits of $1. 4 billion from$40 billion sales. 16 While Renault became the No. 1 automaker in Europe, to be a global player, it had to expand its operations further.By the end of 1990s, it had a very small presence in Asia and was totally absent in the North American market. After the merger of Daimler and Chrysler in 1998, for Renault, expansions became a requisite. And, Nissan seemed a lucrative opportunity, as an alliance with Nissan could help in easier market expansion for Renault in developing markets. While others including get across and DaimlerChrysler had earlier attempted a deal with Nissan, they later withdrew keeping in view the huge debt that Nissan held and its culture that was inflexible. After the alliance, Renault managed to reduce its launching and stock-purchase warrant costs for new product introductions by recruiting managers from Nissan to undertake the launch. At the same time, it sent its employees to Nissan to oversee manufacturing, to achieve cost efficient production. Later Renault acquired Samsung Motors in mho Korea and Roman au tomaker, Dacia as part of its international expansion. With the launch of multi function vehicles, Laguna II and A van time in 2001 and Espace IV in 2002 , and after its association with Formula One racing between 1992 and 1997, its brand popularity improved.By 2004,Renault held strong foothold in European market and reported a 6. 5%increase in sales by the first half of 2004 and was the fourth largest auto company in the world. It held nearly 11%market share in Western European market in passenger car and light vehicle cars. At the same time, Renault performance in large cars segment was sluggish and was struggling to achieve operating margin of 4%, when the demand for cars in the European market was low. Some of the new launches like the Vel Satis, a tall saloon luxury model, were not very successful in the market. Are launch in the US market was also underway.Renault was facing other challenges along with Nissan and other automakers. environmental friendly cars, which seemed a l ikely potential opportunity, were costly to manufacture at the price the customers were ready to pay. Renault was planning for expansions in Chinese market and South Korea and other parts of Asia through alliance with Nissan. Next gtgt 16For Renault, a new chance to take on the world, www. businessweek. com, November 15th 1999 Carlos Ghosn as CEO of Renault and Nissan By 2010, Nissan and Renault would build their cars using the common building blocks.Ghosn viewed the alliance as managing contradiction between synergy and identity17and confirmed that while gaining synergies, the individual identity of each brand would be safeguarded. The other major alliances in the industry, the DaimlerChrysler and the GM/Fiat had not proved to be very successful because of improper management of merged assets, trans-atlantic product development and failed attempt in understanding local market Ghosn confirmed that Nissans alliance with Renault would creatively achieve it. At the same time the allian ce would avoid merger and would maintain a spirit of partnership18.The alliance would be the fourth largest automobile group in the world. In October 2004, the first car was built using a common platform of Nissan and Renault. Modus, a subcompact minivan of Renault shared its base with Nissans Micra saving $500million for Renault every year. After Carlos Ghosn succeeds Schweitzer at Renaults in April 2005, he would also continue as the CEO of Nissan. Carlos Ghosn was affirmative that he would not leave the company unless he finds the right person who would succeed him at Nissan. He stressed on the need for a Japanese as the CEO of Nissan in such a culture sensitive country.While at Nissan, he had transformed himself into a Japanese, adapting to the culture, analysts feared if he would breach the French business etiquettes as he takes up the rein at Renault. 19deuce of the five vice presidents at Renault would retire soon, and Carlos Ghosn was to take up the reigns at both the compan ies, during such senior level management changes. At the same time, many feared if the sense of urgency brought through NRP would continue at Nissan or get out the company slip back to its old habits, when Carlos Ghosn leaves.The pressure was considered to be very high, as an analyst stated, He leave alone be less present at Renault than he was at Nissan, and less present at Nissan that he used to be. I believe this challenge will be more difficult. 20 The alliance had helped both the companies equally, in terms of cost savings from not requiring to construct new plants where the alliance can use common buildings, common platforms etc. This had also helped them enter new markets faster and gain other synergies . The purchasing power had also increased as they ordered and bought components through Renault-Nissan purchasing organization for both the companies at a time. The alliance had from the beginning ensured that the inter-company cultural clashes do not exist, by maintaining individual cultural identities. While a merger had been avoided since the beginning, Carlos Ghosn confirmed that it would be its agenda in future also. Carlos Ghosn remarked that when he takes up the two positions, he would blend the strengths of the people at the companies, the innovation excellence of the French and the dedication towards manufacturing of the Japanese. 21He affirmed that his tenure at Nissan had allowed him to learn the real centerfield of successful leaders, and would drive his success in future also.He called himself, not a theorist of citizenship but an expert in multi nationality. 22 Carlos Ghosn called the three major attributes, Value, Transparency and Performance as the ones that would determine the competence of any CEO. He believed that they act as standards for leadership in global business, in the light of ontogenesis corporate scandals, when the top executives of the companies were increasingly coming under scrutiny. He explained that the unquestion able results that are delivered along with simultaneous value creation to the customers and the other stakeholders through maintaining transparency, reflect an efficient leadership.By communicating every strategy to every person concerned, he maintained that it would facilitate a faster reaction to dynamics in the fiercely competitive global market place. An analyst once called Carlos Ghosn, amanager without borders, polyglot and cosmopolitan. Talking about his dual roles and the cultural barriers that he will have to face as he moves to Renault while also fountainhead Nissan, Carlos Ghosn said, Global is global. In my opinion, this is going to be the story of the twenty-first century.This is whats going to happen in the twenty-first century youre going to see the development of more global standards, some kind of global references youre going to see more and more of it. But globality doesnt mean uniformity. It doesnt mean that. Youll still have different cultures, youll still ha ve different tastes, and youll still have some adaptations to make to different countries, but youll have some basic things that will be common globally, especially in the economic area. 23 17Renaults alliance with Nissan, www. economist. om, August 16th 2001 18Parachkevova, Anna CEO outlines Nissans resurgence, http//thedartmouth. com, May 12th 2004 19Carlos Ghosn- Nissan motor, www. businessweek. com, January 8th 2000 20Tierney, Christine Leadership, bold moves help Renault save Nissan, www. detnews. com, October 24th 2003 21Smith, Duvergne, Nancy Nissan Renault alliance faces down few challenges, http//web. mit. edu, November 18th 2004 22Abescat, Bruno I am an expert of multi nationality, http//livres. lexpress. fr 23Carlos Ghosn standing at the global crossing, op. cit